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Been Down So Long It Looks Like Up To Me—Richard Fariña.
Abstract. Psychologists report that people make choices on the basis of “decision utilities” that routinely overestimate the “experienced utility” consequences
of these choices. This paper argues that this dichotomy between decision and
experienced utilities may be the solution to an evolutionary design problem.
We examine a setting in which evolution designs agents with utility functions
that must mediate intertemporal choices, and in which there is an incentive
to condition current utilities on the agent’s previous experience. Anticipating
future utility adjustments can distort intertemporal incentives, a conflict that
is attenuated by separating decision and experienced utilities.
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Introduction

People who contemplate living in California routinely report that they expect to
be significantly happier there, primarily on the strength of California’s blissful
weather. People who actually live in California are no happier than the rest
of us (Schkade and Kahneman [15]). Far from being a California quirk, this
“focussing illusion” is sufficiently widespread as to prompt the conclusion that
“Nothing ... will make as much difference as you think.” [15, p. 345]1
Psychologists interpret these findings by drawing a distinction between decision utility and experienced utility (e.g., Kahneman and Thaler [7]). Decision
utilities are the utilities that determine (or at least describe, in a revealedpreference interpretation) our choices. For Schkade and Kahneman [15], these
are the relevant utilities when people contemplate moving to California. Experienced utilities are the rewards we realize once the choices are made. For Schkade
and Kahneman, these are reflected in the satisfaction reports from people living
in California.
Experienced utilities are of no interest to a fiercely neoclassical economist—
decision utilities suffice to describe behavior. However, if we are to consider
welfare questions, the difference may be important. If experienced utilities do
not match decision utilities, should we persevere with the standard economists’
presumption that decision utilities are an appropriate guide to well-being? Or
should we exhort people to work more diligently in discerning their future experienced utilities, and then use these to override their decision utilities (as
Schkade and Kahneman [15] imply)? Once we have contending utilities (or contending selves, in the common parlance of behavioral economics), such questions
are both inevitable and vexing.
We adopt a positive perspective in this paper, answering the following question: Why might we have both decision and experienced utilities in the first
place? We take an evolutionary approach. We assume that evolution has
equipped agents with utility functions designed to induce fitness-maximizing
choices. An agent in our model must make choices in each of two periods that
will (along with random events) determine his fitness. Moreover, these choices
give rise to an intertemporal trade-off, in the sense that the optimal secondperiod choice depends upon the alternative chosen in the first period. The
first-period choice may determine the agent’s health or wealth or skill or status,
1 The term “focussing illusion” (e.g., Loewenstein and Schkade [9]) refers to a tendency to
overestimate either the salutary or detrimental effects of current choices. This phenomenon
was thrust into the spotlight by Brickman, Coates and Janoff-Bulman’s [1] study of lottery
winners and paraplegics, and has become the subject of a large literature. See Loewenstein
and Schkade [9] for an introduction and Gilbert [6] for an entertaining popular account.
Attention has also been devoted to the related prospect that people may exhibit a projection
bias (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin [8], Conlin, O’Donoghue and Vogelsang [3]). An
agent exhibits a projection bias if he expects his future preferences to be more similar to his
current preferences than will actually be the case.
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for example, which may in turn affect how aggressive the agent should be in
seeking second-period consumption. Evolution equips the agent with a firstperiod utility function providing the decision utilities shaping the first-period
choice. Evolution also equips the agent with a second-period utility function determining the hedonic rewards he experiences as a result of his first-period and
second-period choices. This latter function is interpreted as experienced utility,
though it also provides the relevant decision utility for the second period.2 We
show that in general, the decision utility shaping the first-period choice does not
match the resulting second-period experienced utility. Evolution systematically
misleads the agent as to the future implications of his choices.
Why should evolution build an agent to do anything other than maximize fitness, without resorting to conflicting utility notions? Evolution’s design problem
is complicated by two constraints. First, there are limits on how large and how
small are the hedonic utilities evolution can give us.3 By themselves, bounds
on utility pose no obstacles. All that matters is that better alternatives get
higher utilities, and we can accommodate this no matter how tight the range of
possible utilities. However, our second assumption is that the agent is likely to
make mistakes when utilities are too close. When alternative 1 provides only a
slightly higher utility than alternative 2, the agent may mistakenly choose alternative 2. As a result, there is an evolutionary advantage to having the utility
function be as steep as possible, so that the agent is dealing with large utility
differences that seldom induce mistakes. This goal conflicts with the bounds on
utility. Evolution’s response is to make the utility function very steep in the
range of decisions the agent is most likely to face, where such steepness is particularly important in avoiding mistaken decisions, and relatively flat elsewhere.4
For this is to be effective, the steep spot of the utility function must be in the
right place. In the second period, the “right place” depends on what happens
in the first period. Evolution thus has an incentive to adjust second-period or
experienced utilities in response to first-period outcomes. But if this is to be
done without distorting first-period decisions, the agent must not anticipate this
adjustment—the experienced utilities guiding second-period decisions must not
match the decision utilities shaping first-period decisions.
Section 2 introduces the evolutionary environment. Section 3 presents the
analysis of decision and experienced utility in the context of a simple model.
Section 4 considers extensions and implications.
2 It

is relevant in this connection that Carter and McBride [2] argue that experienced utility
has similar empirical properties to decision utility.
3 Notice that in taking this position, we are following much of the current literature in
behavioral economics in viewing utility maximization as a neurological process by which we
make choices, rather that simply a description of consistent choices. In particular, our view is
that utilities are induced by chemical processes within our brains that are subject to physical
constraints.
4 Robson [13] argues that utility bounds and limited discrimination between utilities will
induce evolution to strategically position the steep part of the utility function. Rayo and
Becker [12] develop this idea in a model that provides the foundation for our work. Tremblay
and Schultz [17] provide evidence that the neural system encodes relative rather than absolute
preferences, as might be expected under limited discrimination. See Friedman [5] for an early
contribution and Netzer [10] and Wolpert and Leslie [18] for more recent work.
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2
2.1

The Evolution of Utility
The Evolutionary Environment

There are two periods. The agent makes a choice x1 in the first period and
x2 in the second. These choices would be multidimensional in a more realistic
model, but here are taken for simplicity to be elements of [0, 1]. Whenever it is
helpful in conveying intuition, we (temporarily) adopt particular interpretations
of x1 and x2 , such as levels of first-period and second-period consumption, or
as a decision to move to California (or not) and a subsequent decision of how
much time to spend surfing (whether in California or Iowa). We recognize that
our stark one-dimensional variables cannot capture all the subtleties of such
decisions.
The agent’s fitness is determined by his choices x1 and x2 as well as the
realizations s1 and s2 of environmental shocks in the first and second periods.
For example, the agent’s health may depend not only on effort he invests in
procuring food, but also on vagaries of the weather or stock market affecting
the productivity of these efforts. The agent’s first-period choice x1 must be
made in ignorance of the realization s1 , while x2 is chosen knowing s1 but not
s2 .
In the absence of any constraints, evolution’s task of designing an agent
to make fitness-maximizing choices would be trivial. The agent’s problem has
a maximizer (x∗1 , x∗2 (·)), where x∗2 (·) is the optimal mapping from first-period
outcomes to second-period choices. Why would evolution not simply “hardwire” agents to make this optimal decision?
The point of departure for our analysis is the assumption that evolution
cannot hard-wire the alternative (x∗1 , x∗2 (·)), as trivial as this sounds in the context of this model. Our interpretation here is that what it means to choose a
particular value of x1 or x2 changes with the context in which the decision is
made. The agent’s choice may consist of an investment in status that sometimes involves hiding food and other times acquiring education, that sometimes
involves cultivating social relationships with neighbors and other times driving
neighbors away. Moreover, the relevant context fluctuates too rapidly for evolution to adapt. The dominant form of investment can change from clearing
fields to learning C++ too quickly for mutation and selection to keep pace. As
a result, evolution must recognize that the agent will frequently face problems
that are novel from an evolutionary perspective.5
5 Rayo and Becker [12] similarly confront the question of why evolution cannot hard-wire
agents to make optimal choices. They assume that the evolutionarily optimal action depends
upon an environmental state, and that there are so many possible values of this state that it is
prohibitively expensive for evolution to hard-wire the agent to condition actions on every value.
Our assumption that the state is entirely novel is equivalent, differing from Rayo and Becker
primarily in emphasis. Rayo and Becker explicitly include the state variable within their
model, while we sweep it into the background, simply assuming that evolution cannot dictate
optimal choices, in order to simplify the notation. Their simplest model, which corresponds to
our basic model, then makes the analysis more tractable by assuming that the state variable
affects optimal actions but not maximal fitness.
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To capture this constraint, we need to specify the technology by which the
agent’s decisions are converted into fitnesses. Our point of departure is the
relationship
z = z1 + δz2 ,
defining the agent’s realized total fitness z as the sum of realized first-period
fitness z1 and the discounted value of realized second-period fitness z2 , with the
discount factor δ perhaps reflecting a nonunitary survival probability. At this
point, however, we note that it requires only a change in the units in which z
and z1 are measured to normalize the discount factor to be unity, and hence to
rewrite this equation as z = z1 + z2 . This significantly simplifies the following
notation and so we we adopt this convention throughout. We then write
z

= z1 + z2

(1)

=

(2)

[f1 (x1 ) + s1 ] + [γz1 + f2 (x1 , x2 ) + s2 ].

The first line presents our normalized accounting of fitness. The second line
indicates that first-period fitness is a quasilinear function of the first-period
action x1 and realization s1 . For example, x1 may reflect an investment in
skills, and z1 the resulting expertise, or x1 may reflect actions taken in pursuit
of status, and z1 the resulting place in the social order. Second period fitness is
similarly a quasilinear function of the second-period action x2 and realization
s2 , and also a function of both the first-period action x1 and fitness z1 . A
relatively large value of x1 may reflect a first-period investment that enhances
the productivity of x2 in the second period. In addition, a relatively large firstperiod fitness z1 may carry over directly into a higher second-period fitness,
regardless of how z1 is achieved. An agent who is better-nourished in the first
period may enjoy the salutary effects of good health in the second. Section 4.2
describes how quasi-linearity can be generalized.
Technically, the key distinction is that, while evolution cannot attach utilities
to the agent’s choices x1 and x2 , she can attach utilities to total fitnesses. Times
have changed too quickly for evolution to attach utility to passing through the
drive-through coffee line in the morning, but she can reward the resulting feeling
of alertness.
We assume the expected fitness f1 and f2 are strictly concave. This ensures
the existence of unique expected fitness maximizers x∗1 and x∗2 (x1 ), which we
take to be interior. We assume that s1 and s2 are realizations of independent
random variables s̃1 and s̃2 with zero means and with differentiable, symmetric
unimodal densities g1 and g2 , with zero derivatives only at 0. Our results go
through unchanged, and with somewhat simpler technical arguments, if s̃1 and
s̃2 have unbounded supports.
Finally, we should be clear on our view of evolution. We adopt throughout the language of principal-agent theory, viewing evolution as a principal who
“designs” an incentive scheme in order to induce (constrained) optimal behavior
from an agent. However, we do not believe that evolution literally or deliberately solves a maximization problem. We have in mind an underlying model
in which utility functions are the heritable feature defining an agent. These
4

utility functions give rise to frequency-independent fitnesses. Under a simple
process of natural section respecting these fitnesses, expected population fitness
is a Lyapunov function, ensuring that the type maximizing expected fitness
will dominate the population. If the mutation process generating types is sufficiently rich, the outcome of the evolutionary process can then be approximated
by examining the utility function that maximizes expected fitness, allowing our
inquiry to focus on the latter.

2.2

Utility Functions

Evolution can endow the agent with nondecreasing utility functions V1 (z) and
V2 (z|z1 ). In the first period, the agent considers the realized total fitness z produced by the agent’s first-period and anticipated second-period choice, reaping
utility V1 (z). In the second period, the agent’s choice induces a realized total
fitness z and hence corresponding utility V2 (z|z1 ). Notice in particular that evolution can condition second-period utilities on the realization of the first-period
intermediate fitness z1 . Through the technology given by (1)–(2), V1 and V2
implicitly become utility functions on x1 , x2 , s1 and s2 .6
To interpret these utility functions, let us return to our moving-to-California
decision. We think of V1 (z) as representing the utility the agent contemplates
should he move to California, taking into account his projections of how much
surfing he will do once there. V2 (z|z1 ) is the utility the agent realizes, once
he has moved to California. We think of the former as the decision utility
mediating the first choice, and the latter as the resulting experienced utility. If
these functions are identical, we have no focussing illusion.
In the absence of any additional constraints (beyond the inability to write
utilities directly over x1 and x2 ), evolution’s utility-function design problem is
still trivial. She need only give the agent the utility functions
V1 (z)

=

z

V2 (z|z1 )

=

z.

As straightforward as this result is, we believe it violates crucial evolutionary
constraints that we introduce in two steps. Our first assumption is that evolution
faces limits on how large or small a utility she can induce. Our view here is that
utilities must be produced by physical processes, presumably the flow of certain
chemicals in the brain. The agent makes choices leading to a fitness level z, and
receives pleasure from the resulting cerebral chemistry. There are then bounds
on just how strong (or how weak) the resulting sensations can be. Without loss,
we assume that utilities must be drawn from the interval [0, 1].7
6 Our view is that the agent effectively learns which values of x and x lead to high utilities,
1
2
in the process coming to act “as if” the agent “knows” the functions f1 and f2 .
7 Evidence for bounds on the strength of hedonic responses can be found in studies of how
the firing rate of neurons in the pleasure centers of the brain respond to electrical stimulation.
Over an initial range, this response is roughly linear, but eventually high levels of stimulation
cause no further increase. See, for example, Simmons and Gallistel [16].
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The constraint that utilities be drawn from the unit interval poses no difficulties by itself. Essentially, evolution need simply recognize that utility functions
are unique only up to linear transformations. In particular, in this case evolution
need only endow the agent with the utility functions
V1 (z)
V2 (z|z1 )

= A + Bz
= A + Bz,

where A and B are chosen (in particular, with B sufficiently small) so as to
ensure that utility is drawn from the unit interval, no matter what the feasible
values of x1 , x2 , s1 and s2 .
We now add a second constraint to evolution’s problem—there are limits
to the ability of the agent to perceive differences in utility. When asked to
choose between two alternatives whose utilities are very close, the agent may
be more likely to choose the alternative with the higher utility, but is not certain to do so. This is in keeping with our interpretation of utility as reflecting
physical processes within the brain. A very slightly higher dose of a neurotransmitting chemical may not be enough to ensure the agent flawlessly chooses
the high-utility alternative, or there may be randomness in the chemical flows
themselves.8 In particular, we assume that there is a possibly very small εi such
that in each period i, the agent can be assured only of making a choice that
brings him within εi of the maximal utility. We will then be especially interested in the limits as the utility errors εi → 0. It may well be, of course, that
such errors are not small in practice. However, we are interested in the role of
utility constraints in driving a wedge between decision and experienced utilities,
and especially interested in the possibility that such a wedge could arise despite
arbitrarily small errors.
The utility functions V1 and V2 both take z as their argument. In the first
period, z is the agent’s anticipation of his total fitness, given his actions. Does
this give rise to a realized utility V1 (z), inducing the same brain processes as
if the agent had actually secured fitness z? Or does the anticipation trigger a
different process that simply allows the agent to expect that utility V1 (z) will
be forthcoming should z be realized in the second period, and to maximize
the payoff induced by the expected future brain activity? A similar question
arises in the second period. The action x1 and realization s1 are now known,
but second-period decisions must still be made before s2 is realized and z determined, and hence must be guided by anticipations off the resulting utility
V2 (z). Again, is the result an immediate reward, or is the behavior shaped by
expectations of future rewards? Neuroscience is currently silent as to how anticipated outcomes (over spans of more than a few seconds) affect brain activity
8 Very small utility differences pose no problem for classical economic theory, where differences in utility indicate that one alternative is preferred to another, with a small difference
serving just as well as a large one. However, it is a problem when utilities are induced via
physical processes. The psychology literature is filled with studies documenting the inability
of our senses to reliably distinguish between small differences. (For a basic but vivid textbook
treatment, see Foley and Matlin [4].) If the difference between two chemical flows is arbitrarily
small, we cannot be certain that the agent will invariably choose the larger.
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and behavior. Our analysis accommodates various interpretations. Whether V1
and V2 represent anticipations whose underlying physical processes are qualitatively different from those accruing when z is finally realized, or whether the
anticipations of z give rise to immediate utility realizations analogous to those
received when z is realized (or something in between), the result is that evolution has both V1 and V2 available as instruments to induce fitness-maximizing
behavior.

3
3.1

Decision and Experienced Utility
The Second Period

The agent enters the second period having made a choice x1 and realized a
first-period fitness of z1 . The agent cannot distinguish any pair of second-period
choices whose expected utilities are within ε2 > 0 of each other. Hence, instead
of certainly choosing the maximizer x∗2 of Es̃2 V2 (z1 + (γz1 + f2 (x1 , x2 ) + s̃2 )|z1 )
in the second period, the agent may choose any x2 yielding an expected utility
within ε2 of this level, i.e., any x2 with the property that
Es̃2 V2 (z1 +(γz1 +f2 (x1 , x∗2 )+s̃2 )|z1 )−Es̃2 V2 (z1 +(γz1 +f2 (x1 , x2 )+s̃2 )|z1 ) ≤ ε2 .
This give rise to a satisficing set [x2 , x2 ], where x2 < x∗2 < x2 and
Es̃2 V2 ((1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x1 , x2 ) + s̃2 |z1 )

(3)

= Es̃2 V2 ((1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x1 , x2 ) + s̃2 |z1 )
= Es̃2 V2 ((1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x1 , x∗2 ) + s̃2 |z1 ) − ε2 .

(4)

To keep things simple, we assume the agent chooses uniformly over this set.9
It would be more realistic to model the utility perception error ε2 as proportional to the maximized expected fitness, rather than as an absolute error. Doing
so has no effect on our analysis. In particular, we can interpret ε2 as the “just
noticeable difference” in utilities induced by the equilibrium of the proportionalerrors model, and then simplify the notation by writing the constraints as in
(3)–(4), while retaining the proportional interpretation of the errors.
Evolution chooses the utility functions V2 to maximize fitness, subject to (3)–
(4). We summarize the result of this maximization process with the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 There exist functions Z 2 (z1 ) and Z 2 (z1 ), with Z 2 (z1 ) ≤ Z 2 (z1 ),
such that the optimal second-period utility function satisfies
V2 (z|z1 )

=

0, for all z < Z 2 (z1 )

(5)

V2 (z|z1 )

=

1, for all z > Z 2 (z1 ).

(6)

9 We could work with a more general assumption about how the choice from the satisficing
set is made, but must preclude the possibility that an attempt by evolution to improve the
agent’s decisions by increasing x2 and decreasing x2 is thwarted by agent’s pushing more and
more of her choice probability toward these boundaries.
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In the limit as ε2 → 0, the agent’s second-period choice x2 approaches x∗2 (x1 ).
Let us interpret some aspects of this result before turning to the proof.
Notice first that if ε1 > 0, then x1 arises out of random satisficing behavior
in the first period, but nonetheless the second-period choice (when ε2 → 0) is
x∗2 (x1 ), for each realization x1 .
The values Z 2 (z1 ) and Z 2 (z1 ) depend on z1 . This allows evolution to adjust the second-period utility function in order to maximize its effective slope,
minimizing the incidence of mistaken decisions.
Lemma 1 leaves open the question of how the utility function is specified on
the potentially nonempty interval (Z 2 (z1 ), Z 2 (z1 )). In the course of examining
the first period, we will show that this gap shrinks to zero as does ε1 , the firstperiod utility-perception error. In particular, the gap (Z 2 (z1 ), Z 2 (z1 )) arises
because evolution faces uncertainty concerning agent’s first-period choice x1 .
As ε1 → 0, this uncertainty disappears, and in the process Z 2 (z1 ) and Z 2 (z1 )
converge. We thus approach a bang-bang utility function, equalling 0 for small
fitnesses and 1 for large fitnesses.
The bang-bang limiting character of this utility function may appear extreme, dooming the agent to being either blissfully happy or woefully depressed.
Notice, however, that the expected utilities with which the agent evaluates his
choices do not have this property. The expected utility function Es̃2 V2 ((1 +
γ)z1 + f1 (x1 , x2 ) + s̃2 |z1 ) is a continuous function of x2 (given x1 and z1 ).
We now present and discuss the argument behind Lemma 1. Let us first
remove a complication by supposing (temporarily) that evolution can condition
the second-period utility function on the agent’s first-period choice x1 as well
as his first-period fitness z1 (with the assumption concerning x1 dropped in the
last paragraph of this section). In the second period, the agent chooses from
the satisficing set [x2 , x2 ]. Let f 2 be the utility the agent reaps from a choice
at the boundary of this set (and hence f 2 = f2 (x1 , x2 ) = f2 (x1 , x2 ), where
the second equality follows from (3)–(4) and the fact that Es̃2 V2 is strictly
increasing in f2 ). Let f2∗ the the utility from the fitness-maximizing choice (and
hence f2∗ = f2 (x1 , x∗2 )). The agent’s second-period fitness will be higher the
smaller is the satisficing set [x2 , x2 ], or equivalently the larger is f 2 .
The problem is then one of maximizing f 2 , subject to the constraints given
by (3)–(4). The constraints given by (3)–(4) can be written as10
Z
ε2 =
V2 (z|z1 )[g2 (z − [(1 + γ)z1 + f2∗ ]) − g2 (z − [(1 + γ)z1 + f 2 ])]dz. (7)
10 We can reduce (3)–(4) so a single constraint because f (x , x ) = f (x , x ). To arrive
2 1
2 1
2
2
at (7), we first expand the expectations in (3)–(4) to obtain
Z
Z
ε2 =
V2 ((1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x1 , x∗2 ) + s2 |z1 )g2 (s2 )ds2 − V2 ((1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x1 , x2 ) + s2 |z1 )g2 (s2 )ds2
Z
Z
=
V2 ((1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x1 , x∗2 ) + s2 |z1 )g2 (s2 )ds2 − V2 ((1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x1 , x2 ) + s2 |z1 )g2 (s2 )ds2 .

A change of the variable of integration from s2 to z then gives (7).
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Now let us fix a candidate value f 2 and ask if it could be part of an optimal
solution. If we could choose a utility function V2 (z|z1 ) so as make the right
side of (7) exceed ε2 , then the candidate value f 2 would give us slack in the
constraints (3)–(4), and the utility function in question would in fact induce a
larger value of f 2 than our candidate (since the right side of (7) is decreasing
in f 2 ). This would imply that our candidate value does not correspond to an
optimal utility function. Hence, the optimal utility function must maximize the
right side of (7), for the optimal value f 2 , in the process giving a maximum
equal to ε2 . We now need only note that (7) is maximized by setting the utility
V2 (z|z1 ) as small as possible when g2 (z−[(1+γ)z1 +f2∗ ])−g2 (z−[(1+γ)z1 +f 2 ]) <
0 and by setting the utility V2 (z|z1 ) as large as possible when this inequality
is reversed, and hence the optimal utility function must have this property.
Because g2 has a symmetric, unimodal density with nonzero derivative (except
at 0), there is a threshold Ẑ2 (z1 ) ∈ [(1 + γ)z1 + f 2 , (1 + γ)z1 + f2∗ ] such these
differences are negative for lower values of z and positive for higher values of z.
This gives us a utility function V2 (z|z1 ) that takes a jump from 0 to 1 at Ẑ2 (z1 ).
As ε2 → 0 and hence the agent’s satisficing set shrinks, Ẑ2 (z1 ) converges to
(1 + γ)z1 + f2∗ and the agent flawlessly maximizes f2 (x1 , x2 )by choosing x∗2 (x1 ).
To acquire some intuition, notice that the optimal utility function exhibits
features familiar from principal-agent problems. In particular, consider a hiddenaction principal-agent problem with two effort levels. It is a standard result that
the optimal payment attached to an outcome is increasing in the outcome’s likelihood ratio, or (intuitively) in the relative likelihood of that outcome having
come from high vs. low effort. Much the same property appears here. Evolution
would like expected utility to fall off as rapidly as possible as the agent moves
away from the optimal decision x∗2 (x1 ), thereby “steepening” the utility function and reducing the possibility of a mistakenly suboptimal choice. Evolution
does so by attaching high payments to fitnesses with high likelihood ratios, or
(intuitively) outcomes that are relatively likely to have come from an optimal
rather than a suboptimal choice.
The key property in characterizing the utility function in our case is then
a single-crossing property, namely that the relevant likelihood ratios fall short
of one for small fitnesses and exceed one for large fitnesses. The likelihood
comparison appears in difference rather than ratio form in (7), but the required
single-crossing property is implied by the familiar monotone likelihood ratio
property, that g2g(z−α)
is increasing in z, for α > 0.
2 (z)
This would give us Lemma 1 (and more), were it not for our counterfactual
assumption that evolution can “observe” x1 as well as z1 . Because second-period
utilities cannot be conditioned on x1 , evolution must form a posterior expectation over the likely value of x1 , given her observation of z1 .11 She would then
choose a utility function V2 (z|z1 ) that maximizes the agent’s expected fitness,
given this posterior. In particular, for each possible value of x1 , the agent will
11 We emphasize again that evolution does not literally form posterior beliefs over the agent’s
actions and then solve an optimization problem. The results follow from the observation that
fitness will be maximized by that utility function that would be optimal given the appropriate
posterior beliefs.
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mix over a set [x2 (x1 ), x2 (x1 )], being the satisficing set corresponding to (3)–(4)
(for that value of x1 ). Evolution is concerned with the resulting expected value of
the total fitness (1+γ)z1 +f2 (x1 , x2 )+s2 , where the expectation is taken over the
likely value of x1 (given z1 ), over the choice of x2 (from the resulting satisficing
set), and the draw of s2 (governed by g2 ). Evolution increases expected fitness
by reducing the size of the satisficing sets [x2 (x1 ), x2 (x1 )]. While this is in general a quite complicated problem, the key observation is that there exists a value
Z 2 (z1 ) such that g2 (z − [(1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x1 , x∗2 )]) − g2 (z − [(1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x1 , x2 )])
is negative for z < Z 2 (z1 ), for every x1 in the first-period satisficing set, as well
as a value Z 2 (z1 ) such that these differences are all positive for all z > Z 2 (z1 ).12
It thus decreases the size of every possible satisficing set to set V2 (z|z1 ) = 0 for
z < Z 2 (z1 ) and V2 (z|z1 ) = 1 for z > Z 2 (z1 ). This leaves us without having
determined what happens on the set [Z 2 (z1 ), Z 2 (z1 )], and if there is a wide
range of possible x1 values, this gap might be large. As ε1 gets small, however,
the first-period satisficing set will shrink, causing the gap [Z 2 (z1 ), Z 2 (z1 )] to
disappear (cf. Lemma 2). Finally, even for fixed (but small) ε1 > 0, it follows
from the fact that V2 (z|z1 ) is increasing and the continuity of f2 that as ε2
approaches zero, the agent’s second-period satisficing sets collapse on x∗2 (x1 ),
for each realization x1 of the first-period random satisficing choice.

3.2

The First Period

Attention now turns to the first period. For simplicity, we take the limit ε2 → 0
before considering the optimal first-period utility function, returning to this
assumption at the end of this section.
The agent has a utility function V1 (z) with V1 ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, the agent
cannot distinguish any pair of choices whose expected utilities are within ε1 > 0
of each other. This again leads to a random choice from a satisficing set [x1 , x1 ],
where
Es̃1 ,s̃2 V1 (f1 (x1 ) + s̃1 + [γ(f1 (x1 ) + s̃1 ) + f2 (x1 , x∗2 (x1 )) + s̃2 ])
=

Es̃1 ,s̃2 V1 (f1 (x1 ) + s̃1 +

=

Es̃1 ,s̃2 V1 (f1 (x∗1 ) + s̃1 +

[γ(f1 (x1 ) + s̃1 ) + f2 (x1 , x∗2 (x1 )) + s̃2 ])
[γf1 (x∗1 ) + s̃1 ) + f2 (x1 , x∗2 (x∗1 )) + s̃2 ]) − ε1 .

(8)
(9)

In the first period, the agent randomizes uniformly over the set [x1 , x1 ]. Evolution chooses the utility function V1 (z) to maximize expected fitness, subject to
(8)–(9).
Once again, we have a bang-bang function in realized utilities, with the
expected utility function Es̃1 ,s̃2 V1 (f1 (x1 )+ s̃1 +[γ(f1 (x1 )+ s̃1 )+f2 (x1 , x∗2 (x1 ))+
s̃2 ]) being a continuous function of x1 . Section 5.1 uses arguments parallelling
those applied to the second period to prove:
12 This follows from the observation that f is bounded, and hence so are the values [(1 +
2
γ)z1 + f2 (x1 , x∗2 (x1 ))] and [(1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x1 , x2 (x1 ))] = [(1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x1 , x2 )], over the set
of possible satisficing values of x1 , with the former larger than the latter.
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Lemma 2 There exists a value Ẑ1 such that the optimal first-period utility function is given by
V1 (z)

=

0, for all z < Ẑ1

V1 (z)

=

1, for all z > Ẑ1 .

In the limit as ε1 → 0, we have
Ẑ1 = (1 + γ)f1 (x∗1 ) + f2 (x∗1 , x∗2 (x∗1 )),
as well as
Z 2 (z1 ) →

(1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x∗1 , x∗2 (x∗1 ))

Z 2 (z1 ) →

(1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x∗1 , x∗2 (x∗1 )).

The final part of this lemma resolves a lingering question from the preceding
analysis of the second period, showing that the intermediate range [Z 2 , Z 2 ] on
which we had not pinned down the second-period utility function disappears
as ε1 tends to zero and hence the randomness in the agent’s first-period choice
disappears.
The ideas behind this result parallel those of the second period. The utility
perception error ε1 causes the agent to choose x1 randomly from a satisficing set
[x1 , x1 ], and evolution’s task is to choose the utility function to reduce the size
of this satisficing set. Total fitness is now affected by the random variable s̃1 as
well as s̃2 , and the key to the result is to show that the resulting distribution
over total fitness exhibits a single-crossing property, with larger total fitnesses
relatively more likely to have come from the fitness-maximizing choice x∗2 than
from either of the choices x1 or x1 .
Putting our two intermediate results together, we have shown:
Proposition 1 In the limit as the “utility-perception errors” ε2 and then ε1
approach zero, the optimal utility functions are given by
V1 (z)

=

0, for all z < Ẑ1 = (1 + γ)f1 (x∗1 ) + f2 (x∗1 , x∗2 (x∗1 ))

V1 (z)

=

1, for all z > Ẑ1 = (1 + γ)f1 (x∗1 ) + f2 (x∗1 , x∗2 (x∗1 ))

V2 (z|z1 )

=

0, for all z < Ẑ2 (z1 ) = (1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x∗1 , x∗2 (x∗1 ))

V2 (z|z1 )

=

1, for all z > Ẑ2 (z1 ) = (1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x∗1 , x∗2 (x∗1 )).

We thus have bang-bang utility functions in each period. The jump in the
second-period function is adjusted in response to the agent’s first-period fitness
outcome, shifting upward whenever the agent has a more favorable first-period
outcome z1 and shifting downward in response to disappointing first-period
outcomes. Intuitively, this allows evolution to adjust the steep part of secondperiod expected utility to occur in the range of decisions likely to be relevant
in the second period, in the process strengthening the second-period incentives.
11

As the utility-perception errors ε1 and ε2 get small, the agent’s choices collapse
around the optimal choices x∗1 and x2 (x∗1 ).
Our argument can be easily adapted to establish Proposition 1 under the
assumption that ε2 goes to zero sufficiently fast relative to ε1 (as opposed to
taking ε2 → 0 first). Indeed, we can establish Proposition 1 no matter how the
utility-perception errors ε1 and ε2 go to zero, with additional technical assumptions and a somewhat more involved argument. In order to evaluate the utility
consequences of his first-period actions, the agent must know what his subsequent second-period actions will be. Taking ε2 to zero before examining the first
period, as we have done, simplifies the argument by allowing the agent to unambiguously anticipate the choice x∗2 (x1 ) in the second period. What should the
agent anticipate if ε2 > 0? His second-period choice will now be a random draw
from a satisficing set. An apparently natural assumption would give the agent
rational expectations about his second-period choice. However, the satisficing
set is determined by the second-period utility function, and under the separation of decision and experienced utilities, the agent does not correctly anticipate
the second-period utility function governing the choice of x2 .13 It is then conceptually problematic to assume rational expectations. Whatever rule evolution
gives the agent for anticipating second-period choices, we will obtain the results
given in Proposition 1 as long as random second-period choices do not reverse
first-period fitness rankings. In particular, the fitness-maximizing first-period
choice x∗1 gives a distribution of total fitnesses that first-order stochastically
dominates the distribution induced by the suboptimal choices x1 or x2 , when
each is paired with the corresponding optimal second-period choice x∗2 (·). It
would suffice for a general limit result that for ε2 > 0 (but small), the optimal
choice x∗1 still gives fitnesses that first-order stochastically dominate those of x1
or x2 ; given the rule used by the agent to anticipate second-period choices.14
One obvious sufficient condition for this to hold is that f2 (x1 , x2 ) be separable
in x1 and x2 (with the agent’s anticipated second-period choice then naturally
being independent of x1 ). Other sufficient conditions would allow more flexible
technologies, at the cost of more cumbersome statements.

3.3

Comparing Decision and Experienced Utilities

We now compare the agent’s decision and experienced utilities—are the utilities
guiding the agent’s decision the same as those the agent will experience when
the resulting outcome is realized?
To answer this question, suppose the agent considers the possible outcome
(x1 , s1 , x2 , s2 ). For example, the agent may consider moving to California (the
choice of x1 ), learning to surf (the choice of x2 ), finding a job (the realization
13 Notice that in the limit as ε → 0, it need only be the case that second-period expected
2
utility will be increasing in fitness to ensure that x∗2 (x1 ) will be chosen in the second period,
making rational expectations straightforward.
14 Total fitness would then continue to exhibit the appropriate version of the single-crossing
property given by (19)–(20), with the agent’s belief about x2 as well as those about s̃1 and
s̃2 now being random.
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s1 ) and enjoying a certain amount of sunshine (the realization s2 ). Let us
assume the agent anticipates choosing x2 optimally in the second period, so
that x2 = x∗2 (x1 ). Then fix x1 and look at utility as s1 and s2 vary. If the
outcome considered by the agent gives (1+γ)[f1 (x1 )+s1 ]+f2 (x1 , x2 )+s2 > Ẑ1 ,
then he attaches the maximal utility of one to that outcome. However, if the
scenario contemplated by the agent at the same time involves a value s2 < 0 (the
agent contemplates a good job realization and hence a success without relying
on outstanding weather), then his realized experienced utility will be zero, since
then
z

=

(1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x1 , x∗2 (x1 )) + s2 < (1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x1 , x∗2 (x1 ))

=⇒ V2 (z|z1 ) = 0.
The agent’s decision utility of one thus gives way to an experienced utility of
zero.
Alternatively, if the agent considers a situation where (1 + γ)[f1 (x1 ) + s1 ] +
f2 (z1 , x2 )+s2 < Ẑ1 , then this generates a decision utility level of zero. However,
if, at the same time s2 > 0, his experienced utility will be one.
The agent’s decision and experienced utilities will thus sometimes agree, but
the agent will sometimes believe he will be (maximally) happy, only to end up
miserable, and sometimes he will believe at the start that he will be miserable,
only to turn out happy. The agent will be mistaken about his experienced utility
whenever his utility projection depends more importantly on the first-period
choice than second-period uncertainty (i.e., anticipating a good outcome because
he is moving to a great location, regardless of the weather; or anticipating a bad
outcome because his location is undesirable, despite good weather). The agent’s
decision utilities fail to take into account that once the first-period choice has
been realized, his utility function will adjust to focus on the second period,
bringing second-period realizations to heightened prominence.
Could this focussing illusion in realized outcomes be washed out in the process of taking expected values? Suppose we know simply that the agent contemplates a first-period utility V1 (z) for some specific z. This is the type of
information typically provided by empirical studies that begin by soliciting decision utilities. What expectations should we have concerning this person’s
second-period utility? Let us suppose the agent chose x∗1 in the first period
and will choose x∗2 (x∗1 ) in the second, both because we expect to observe people
who have made optimal choices (given their decision utilities), and because the
continued existence of the focussing illusion in the presence of optimal choices is
of key interest. This leaves us uncertain as to the likely values of s1 and s2 . We
can let Es̃1 ,s̃2 {V2 (z|z̃1 )|z} represent our expectation of the agents’ second-period
utility, given the observation of z. Then in general,
V1 (z) 6= Es̃1 ,s̃2 {V2 (z|z̃1 )|z}

(10)

=

Pr {V2 (z|z̃1 ) = 1|z}

(11)

=

Pr {s̃2 ≥ 0|z} .

(12)
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Figure 1: First-period decision utility function V1 (z) and expected experienced
utility Es̃1 ,s̃2 {V2 (z|z̃1 )|z}, as a function of z. Observations of small decision
utilities will then on average give way to larger experienced utilities, while large
decision utilities will on average give way to smaller experienced utilities, giving
rise to a focussing illusion.
The larger is z, the more likely it is that s̃2 > 0. As a result, Es̃1 ,s̃2 {V2 (z|z̃1 )|z}
increases from 0 to 1 as z increases from its minimum to its maximum value.
Figure 1 illustrates.
An agent’s view of the utilities guiding his first-period decisions thus give
way to a more moderate view of second-period experienced utilities.

3.4

Separable Decisions

The technology z2 = γz1 + f2 (x1 , x2 ) + s2 encompasses two links between the
first and second period, with second-period fitness being larger the better is
the agent’s first-period outcome, and with the optimal second-period decision
depending on the first-period action. Both links are intuitive, but the first alone
is capable of generating a focussing illusion. What matters is that second-period
utility depends on the first-period outcome, not that second-period optimal
behavior depends on the first-period outcome.
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Suppose that realized fitness is given by
z

= z1 + z2

(13)

= f1 (x1 ) + s1 + [γz1 + f2 (x2 ) + s2 ],

(14)

where s1 and s2 are again realizations of random variables. Then the optimal
value of x2 is independent of x1 and z1 . Nothing from the first period is relevant
for determining the agent’s optimal second-period decision. However, secondperiod fitness does depend on the first-period outcome.
Following the analysis of Sections 3.1–3.2, evolution’s optimal design features
a second-period utility function of
V2 (z|z1 )

=

0, for all z < Ẑ2 (z1 )

V2 (z|z1 )

=

1, for all z > Ẑ2 (z1 ),

where, in the limit as ε2 gets small, Ẑ2 (z1 ) = (1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x∗2 ). In the first
period, we get
V1 (z)

=

0, for all z < Ẑ1

V1 (z)

=

1, for all z > Ẑ1 ,

where Ẑ1 = (1 + γ)f1 (x∗1 ) + f2 (x∗2 ) (as ε1 → 0). Once again, second-period
utility functions adjust in response to first-period outcomes, ensuring a focussing
illusion.

3.5

Sophisticated Agents?

Evolution here has designed the agent to be naive (cf. O’Donoghue and Rabin
[11]), in the sense that the first-period decision is made without anticipating the
attendant second-period utility adjustment. Why not make the agent sophisticated? Why not simply let the agent make decisions on the basis of experienced
utilities?
Given optimal second-period choices, and taking the limit as the utility errors
tend to zero, evolution induces the agent to make an appropriate first-period
choice by having the agent select x1 to maximize
Es̃1 ,s̃2 V1 (z̃) = Pr[(1+γ)s̃1 +s̃2 ≥ ((1+γ)f1 (x∗1 )+f2 (x∗1 , x∗2 (x∗1 )))−((1+γ)f1 (x1 )+f2 (x1 , x∗2 (x1 )))].
Es̃1 ,s̃2 V1 (z̃) is readily seen to be maximized at x∗1 . Suppose that instead, evolution designed the agent to maximize the expected value of the correctly anticipated, expected experienced utility, or
Es̃1 ,s̃2 V2 (z̃|z̃1 ) = Pr[s̃2 ≥ f2 (x∗1 , x∗2 (x∗1 )) − f2 (x1 , x∗2 (x1 ))].
The agent’s decision utility captures two effects relevant to choosing x1 , namely
the effect on first-period fitness z1 , with implications that carry over to the
second period, and the effect on expected second-period incremental fitness
15

f2 (x1 , x∗2 (x1 )). In contrast, the correctly anticipated experienced utility omits
the first consideration. Expected experienced utility thus leads the agent to
consider only the second-period implications of his decisions, potentially yielding
outcomes that differ markedly from those that would maximize fitness. Making
agents naive increases their fitness.
To illustrate this point, suppose that maxx2 f2 (x1 , x2 ) is independent of x1 ,
though the maximizer may yet depend on x1 . Hence, the action the agent must
take to maximize second-period incremental fitness depends on the outcome of
the first period, though in each case the agent adds the same expected increment
to fitness. In the limiting case of no utility error, we have
Es̃1 ,s̃2 V2 (z̃|z̃1 ) = Pr[s̃2 ≥ f2 (x∗1 , x∗2 (x∗1 )) − f2 (x1 , x∗2 (x1 ))] =

1
,
2

for every value of x1 . Correctly anticipated experienced utility now provides
no incentives at all, while first-period decision utilities still effectively provide
incentives. Why does making the agent sophisticated destroy incentives? The
naive agent believes that a suboptimal choice of x1 will decrease utility. Should
such a suboptimal choice x1 be made, however, the agent’s second-period utility function will (unexpectedly) adjust to the first-period choice x1 to still yield
an expected experienced utility of 12 . From evolution’s point of view, this adjustment plays the critical role of enhancing second-period incentives. Should
the agent be sophisticated enough anticipate it, however, first period incentives evaporate, with expected utility now being independent of the first-period
choice.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Evolution must create incentives in the first period, and naturally constructs decision utilities to penalize
suboptimal choices. However, once a first-period alternative is chosen, evolution
must now induce the best possible second-period choice. In the present model,
she adjusts the agent’s utility function in response to the first-period choice,
causing the optimal second-period choice to induce the same expected utility,
regardless of its first-period predecessor. Suboptimal first-period choices thus
lead to the same experienced utility in the second period as do optimal ones.
The decision-utility penalty attached to suboptimal choices in the first period
is removed in the second in order to construct better second-period incentives.

4
4.1

Discussion
Extensions

We have highlighted the forces behind the focussing illusion by working with a
stark model. A number of extensions would be of interest. Some of these are
conceptually straightforward, even if they are analytically more tedious. For
example, we would be interested in a model spanning more periods, allowing
us to examine a richer collection of investment opportunities. As our model
stands, a first-period investment x1 already yields its gains in the second period.
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What about more prolonged investments? It may take sufficient time to acquire
an education that the agent first becomes accustomed to a low consumption
level, magnifying the initial utility consequences of the education’s consumptionenhancing aftermath, only to have them subsequently eroded.15 Evolution must
now construct a sequence of utility functions, each serving as a decision utility
for current actions and an experienced utility for past actions.
Similarly, it would be interesting to allow z1 and z2 (as well as x1 and x2 ) to
be multidimensional. We derive utility from a variety of sources. Perhaps most
importantly, we can ask not only how evolution has shaped our utility functions, given their arguments, but which arguments she has chosen to include.
At first, the answer to this question seems straightforward. The currency of
evolutionary success is reproduction, and evolution should simply instruct us to
maximize our expected reproductive success. Even if one could solve the attendant measurement issues,16 maximizing this goal directly is presumably beyond
our powers.17 Instead, evolution rewards us for achieving intermediate targets,
such as being well-fed and being surrounded by affectionate members of the
opposite sex. But which intermediate targets should evolution reward? Clearly,
our utility functions should feature arguments that, to the extent possible, are
directly related to the ultimate goal of reproductive success and are sufficiently
straightforward that we can perform the resulting maximization. In addition,
we will suggest below that our utility functions should contain arguments that
are effective at implicitly conveying information to evolution.

4.2

A More General Technology

Quasi-linearity is not needed at all for the second-period analysis. The critical
step in the first-period argument arises in examining the cumulative distribution
function of (1 + γ)s̃1 + s̃2 . Letting G denote this distribution, we have
G(z − [(1 + γ)f1 (x1 ) + f2 (x1 , x∗2 (x1 ))]
= Pr[(1 + γ)s̃1 + s̃2 ] ≤ z − [(1 + γ)f1 (x1 ) + f2 (x1 , x∗2 (x1 ))]
= Pr[(1 + γ)(f1 (x1 ) + s̃1 ) + f2 (x1 , x∗2 (x1 )) + s̃2 ≤ z].

(15)

Now letting g be the density of G, we can interpret g(z − [(1 + γ)f1 (x1 ) +
f2 (x1 , x∗2 (x1 ))]) as the “1ikelihood” that fitness z is the result of choices (x1 , x∗2 (x1 )),
which give rise to expected fitness (1 + γ)f1 (x1 ) + f2 (x1 , x∗2 (x1 )). Paralleling
the second-period argument, it would suffice for this distribution to have the
15 The relevant measure of the length of a period is determined by the how quickly evolution
can induce our utility functions to adapt to our circumstances. A single fine meal is unlikely
to be a preference-altering event, but it may not take long for one to feel “settled” in their
circumstances, prompting drift in the “steep spot” of the utility function.
16 For example, how do we trade off the number of children versus their “quality,” presumably
self-referentially defined by their reproductive success? How do we trade off children versus
grandchildren?
17 Calculating the fitness implications of every action we take would be overwhelming, while
feedback (such as the birth of a healthy child) is sufficiently rare as to make trial-and-error
an ineffective substitute (cf. Robson [14]).
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single-crossing property that g(z − [(1 + γ)f1 (x∗1 ) + f2 (x∗1 , x∗2 (x∗1 ))]) − g(z −
[(1 + γ)f1 (x1 ) + f2 (x1 , x∗2 (x1 ))]) is negative for small values of z (in which case
V1 (z) = 0) and positive for large values (giving V1 (z) = 1), for which it suffices that g exhibit the monotone likelihood ratio property. Intuitively, higher
realized fitness levels must be relatively more likely to have come from actions
yielding higher expected fitness levels. Under the quasilinearity assumption (2),
the cumulative distribution function of fitness in (15) is derived immediately
from the cumulative distribution function G of the relatively simple linear combination (1 + γ)s̃1 + s̃2 of the random variables s̃1 and s̃2 . This ensures (as we
show in Section 5.1) that the corresponding density g exhibits the single-crossing
property.
Now suppose fitness is given by z = z1 + z2 = f1 (x1 , s1 ) + f2 (z1 , x2 , x2 , s2 ).
This general technology will give rise to an analogous utility function if the
counterpart of (15) again gives rise to a single crossing property. However, now
we must define the cumulative distribution function of fitness directly as
Ĝ(z) = Pr[f1 (x1 , s̃1 ) + f2 (f1 (x1 , s̃1 ), x1 , x∗2 (f1 (x1 , s̃1 ), x1 ), s̃2 ) ≤ z].
In this case, Ĝ is the cumulative distribution of a potentially complicated, nonlinear function of s̃1 and s̃2 . We can then no longer automatically count on Ĝ
exhibiting the requisite single-crossing property. Instead, this property is now
a potentially complicated joint assumption on the distributions or the random
variables and the technology. Simple sufficient conditions for this property are
then elusive, though we have no reason to doubt that higher realized fitnesses
will again be relatively more likely to have emerged from actions yielding higher
expected fitnesses.
We believe there are good reasons to expect the desired single-crossing property to hold, even if the primitive conditions leading to the requisite monotonicity property are not easily identified in the general model. Bringing us back
to ideas which we opened Section 4, evolution has not only designed our utility functions, but has chosen the arguments to include in those functions. We
have been chosen to have a taste for sweetness, whereas we could just as easily have been chosen to have different tastes. Among the many considerations
behind what gets included in our utility functions, we expect one to be that
the technology surrounding the variable in question exhibits the single-crossing
properties required for simple utility functions to deliver strong incentives. We
thus expect the single-crossing property to be one of the features that makes a
variable a good candidate for inclusion in our utility function, and hence think
it likely that the property will hold precisely because evolution has an incentive to attach utilities to variables with this property. Once we have that, we
immediately reproduce the results of Section 3.2 in the more general setting.

4.3

Alternative Utility Functions

We have assumed that evolution writes first-period and second-period utility
functions of the form V1 (z) and V2 (z|z1 ). What if evolution could write utility functions of the form V1 (z1 , z2 ) and V2 (z1 , z2 )? Notice that the difference
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between the second-period utility functions V2 (z|z1 ) and V2 (z1 , z2 ) is one of
notation only—allowing a function of z = z1 + z2 to be conditioned on z1 is
equivalent to allowing V2 to depend on z1 and z2 . In the first period, allowing
z1 and z2 to enter the utility function separately potentially opens new possibilities. In a special case of our question, why not write the utility function as
V1 (z1 ), i.e., why make the agent farsighted at all?
Consider first the technology given by (13)–(14). Then evolution can do no
better than to give the agent the utility functions (in the limit as ε1 → 0 and
ε2 → 0)
V1 (z1 )

=

0, for all z1 < ẑ1 = f1 (x∗1 )

V1 (z1 )

=

1, for all z1 > ẑ1 = f1 (x∗1 )

V2 (z|z1 )

=

0, for all z < Ẑ2 (z1 ) = (1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x∗2 )

V2 (z|z1 )

=

1, for all z > Ẑ2 (z1 ) = (1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x∗2 ).

In this case, there is no need to trouble the agent with second-period implications
when the agent is making his first-period choice, as the first-period action x1
has no second-period implications. The first-period fitness z1 still carries over
into the total fitness achieved in the second period, but this does nothing but
reinforce the conclusion that the agent should maximize first-period fitness.
Do we have a focussing illusion here? On the one hand, the second-period
utility cutoff Ẑ2 (z1 ) adjusts in response to first-period realized fitness z1 , ensuring that the agent will often encounter second-period fitness realizations that
do not match his previous expectation of second-period utility. However, only
first-period outcomes and utilities shape the first-period choice. In particular,
it would make no difference whether this agent were naive or sophisticated. It
is as if V1 (z1 ) is both the decision and experienced utility for the choice of x1 .
Perhaps the best description is that we have a focussing illusion, but an irrelevant one. No one in this setting would expect people to make better decisions
were they better in touch with their experienced utilities.
This utility-design procedure would run into difficulties with the technology
given by (1)–(2) (and hence our concentration on the former in the bulk of this
paper). Here, not only z1 but the first-period choice x1 enters the second-period
fitness. It no longer suffices to simply design the agent to maximize the expected
value of first-period fitness z1 , as the agent must trade off higher values of z1
with the second-period implications of x1 . Maximizing total fitness may require
settling for a lower value of expected first-period fitness, in order to invest in
a level of x1 that boosts expected second-period fitness. Of course, evolution
need not design the utility function to maximize the expected value of z1 . It
may be that the optimal value of x1 is consistent with an expected first-period
fitness value f1 (x∗1 ), and that evolution could design a utility function that is
not monotonic in z1 and whose maximized expected value equals f1 (x∗1 ). Even
if this were feasible, however, there would still in general be more than one value
of x1 consistent with f1 (x∗1 ), so that simply hitting the right value f1 (x∗1 ) does
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not suffice to maximize fitness. This problem is likely to be all the more severe in
more realistic, multidimensional models. The obvious solution to this problem
is to simply write first-period utility as a function of z = z1 + z2 , leading to our
model.

4.4

Smooth Utility Functions

The optimal utility functions in our model assign only the utilities zero and
one to realized outcomes. Can we obtain realized utilities that are not always
zero or one? To see why this is important, note that the gist of a focussing
illusion is that anticipations of high utilities give way to lower realizations, and
anticipations of low utilities give rise to higher realizations. When anticipated
utilities are always set at either their minimum or maximum value, it seems that
one can hardly avoid such an outcome. Should we expect the focussing illusion
to survive in a more realistic model?
To demonstrate how to do this, we begin with the model of Section 3.4.
The key new feature is the addition of a shock r̃ that is observed by the agent
before the first choice must be made but is unobservable to evolution. This
shock captures the possibility that there may be characteristics of the agent’s
environment that affect the agent’s fitness, but that fluctuate too rapidly for
evolution to directly condition his behavior. The agent may know whether the
most recent harvest has been good or bad, or whether the agent is in the midst
of a boom or recession. Fitness thus varies with a state that is unobserved by
evolution (as in Rayo and Becker [12]). Suppose that realized fitness is given by
z

= r + z1 + z2
= r + f1 (x1 ) + s1 + [γz1 + f2 (x2 ) + s2 ],

where the associated random variables s̃1 , s̃2 and r̃ are independent.
Two assumptions significantly simplify the analysis. First, r̃ takes only a
finite number of possible outcomes (r1 , . . . , rK ). Our second assumption, made
precise after acquiring the required notation, is that the dispersion in the values
of r̃ is large relative to the supports of s̃1 and s̃2 . Intuitively, the new information
in r̃ the agent can observe is relatively important.
The agent is endowed with a second-period utility function V2 (z|z1 ). This
is non-decreasing in fitness z, where V2 (z|z1 ) ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose that z1 has
been realized in the first-period and the agent has observed realization rk of the
random variable r̃. The agent then chooses from a satisficing set of the form
[xk2 (z1 ), xk2 (z1 )] 3 x∗2 where
Es̃2 V2 ((1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x∗2 ) + rk + s̃2 ) − Es̃2 V2 ((1 + γ)z1 + f2 (xk2 ) + rk + s̃2 ) (16)
= Es̃2 V2 ((1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x∗2 ) + rk + s̃2 ) − Es̃2 V2 ((1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x̄k2 ) + rk + s̃2 ) (17)
= ε2 ,
and f2 (xk2 (z1 )) = f2 (xk2 (z1 )).
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Consider now evolution’s optimal choice of V2 (z|z1 ). We can rewrite (16) as
Z



V2 (z|z1 ) g2 (z − (1 + γ)z1 − f2 (x∗2 ) − rk ) − g2 (z − (1 + γ)z1 − f2 (xk2 ) − rk ) dz = ε2 .

(18)
We could similarly rewrite (17), but the fact that f2 (xk2 (z1 )) = f2 (xk2 (z1 )) allows
us to work with (18) alone throughout. Define Z2k (z1 ) by the requirement that
g2 (Z2k (z1 ) − (1 + γ)z1 − f2 (x∗2 ) − rk ) = g2 (Z2k (z1 ) − (1 + γ)z1 − f2 (xk2 ) − rk ).
Since g2 is symmetric and unimodal (with nonzero derivative except at 0), there
exists a unique such Z2k (z1 ) ∈ [(1 + γ)z1 + f2 (xk2 ) + rk , (1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x∗2 ) + rk ].
If we could fix the value of rk , we would then have precisely the problem of
Section 3.4. Evolution would set V2 (z|z1 ) = 0 for z < Z2k (z1 ) and V2 (z|z1 ) = 1
for z > Z2k (z1 ), with Z2k (z1 ) → (1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x∗2 ) + rk as ε2 → 0. Now, however,
we have not just one such problem, but a collection of k such problems, one
corresponding to each possible value of rk . At this point, we simplify the interaction between these problems by invoking our assumption that the successive
values of rk are sparse, relative to the support of s̃1 and s̃2 , so that for each value
of z, there is at most one value rk that can make g2 (z −(1+γ)z1 −f2 (x∗2 )−rk ) or
g2 (z −(1+γ)z1 −f2 (xk2 )−rk ) nonzero. Equivalently, each possible realization rk
gives rise to a set of possible realizations of z̃ (conditioning on z1 throughout),
each of which can arise from no other realization of r̃k . On this set of values,
evolution would like to set V2 (z|z1 ) as low as possible for z < Z2k (z1 ), and as
high as possible for z > Z2k (z1 ). The implicit constraint behind the “if possible”
in these statements is that V2 (z) must be non-decreasing. Hence, for example,
setting V2 (z|z1 ) relatively low for a value z < Z2k (z1 ) relevant for the realization rk , while improving incentives conditional on realization rk , constrains the
incentives that can be provided for smaller realizations.
These observations immediately lead to the conclusion that, given z1 and ε2 ,
there will be an ascending sequence of values (V20 , . . . , V2K ) such that
V2 (z|z1 )

=

V20 = 0 for all z < Z21 (z1 )

V2 (z|z1 )

=

V2k for all z ∈ [Z2k (z1 ), Z2k+1 (z1 )), k = 1, ..., K − 1

V2 (z|z1 )

=

V2K = 1 for all z ≥ Z2K (z1 ).

In the limit as ε2 → 0, we have Z2k (z1 ) → (1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x∗2 ) + rk , and hence, a
utility function given by
0 for all z < (1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x∗2 ) + r1

V2 (z|z1 )

=

V2 (z|z1 )

= V2k for all z ∈ [(1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x∗2 ) + rk , (1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x∗2 ) + rk+1 ), k = 1, ..., K − 1

V2 (z|z1 )

=

1 for all z ≥ (1 + γ)z1 + f2 (x∗2 ) + rK .

The remaining task is then to calculate the values V21 , . . . , V2K−1 . It is
straightforward to write the programming problem these values must solve and
to find conditions characterizing the equilibrium. In general, however, these are
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quite complex. Section 5.2 presents an example in which enough structure is
imposed on the problem to admit a simple closed-form solution.
The first period situation is analogous to that provided above. Evolution’s
criterion is then E [(1 + γ)f1 (x1 ) + s̃1 + f2 (x∗2 ) + s̃2 + r̃] = (1 + γ)Ef1 (x1 ) +
f2 (x∗2 ), given optimal choice in the second period, but allowing for random
satisficing behavior in the first. In the limit where ε1 → 0, it then follows that
0 for all z < (1 + γ)f1 (x∗1 ) + f2 (x∗2 ) + r1

V1 (z)

=

V1 (z)

= V1k for all z ∈ [(1 + γ)f1 (x∗1 ) + f2 (x∗2 ), (1 + γ)f1 (x∗1 ) + f2 (x∗2 )), k = 1, . . . , K − 1

V1 (z)

=

1 for all z ≥ (1 + γ)f1 (x∗1 ) + f2 (x∗2 ) + rK

where the values V1k , k = 0, . . . , K match those of the second period.
The utility functions V1 and V2 now increase in K steps, becoming nearly
smooth as K gets large. Once again, it is optimal to dissociate first period utility
V1 (z) from second period utility V2 (z|z1 ). Each utility function in the second
period is a replica of the utility function in the first period, being a horizontal
translation of the first period utility function by the random shock (1 + γ)s̃1 ,
whose mean is zero. It can be shown that, in each neighborhood of each jump
point, the first-period utility function V1 (z) is more extreme than the expected
second-period function EV2 (z|z̃1 ). Indeed, the argument is essentially identical
to that used when utilities had a single jump.

4.5

Implications

Psychologists and classical economists tend to approach the concept of utility
from different perspectives. Psychologists are more apt to give utility a direct
hedonic interpretation, and to be comfortable with the idea of multiple forms of
utility. Classical economists are more inclined to think of utility as an analytical
device, and to always work with only a single notion of utility. Recent advances
in behavioral economics have highlighted this apparent contradiction.
Our analysis suggests that if we interpret utility as having an evolutionary
origin, in the process embracing the hedonic interpretation, then we should
expect a distinction between decision and experienced utility. Psychologists
are prone to go further, arguing that decisions would be improved if decision
utility were replaced by expected experienced utility. Our model provides no
support for this view. Decision and experienced utilities combine to produce
fitness-maximizing choices. To an observer, the resulting choices will exhibit
all the characteristics of rational behavior, including satisfying the revealedpreference axioms (as long as the utility errors are sufficiently small, and with
fitness as the underlying utility function), despite the seeming inconsistencies
between decision and experienced utilities. Replacing the resulting decisions
with choices based on experienced utilities can only reduce fitness.
Of course, maximizing fitness may not be the relevant goal. There is no
compelling reason why conscious beings should, as a moral imperative, strive
to maximize the fitness criterion implicitly guiding their evolution. Once we
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abandon fitness, however, we are left with little guide as to what the appropriate welfare criterion should be, and little reason to think that emphasizing
the fitness-maximizing experienced utilities should yield a welfare improvement.
One might respond by arguing that experienced utility is the appropriate criterion, but we see little reason for singling out one particular utility function as
the appropriate one.
What implications does our model have? Evolutionary explanations of behavior are intriguing, but provide their most convincing payoff when pointing
to behavior implications that would hitherto have gone unnoticed. Training
people to place greater emphasis on experienced utilities will alter the incentives to make investments in future utility. In particular, suppose we consider
actions whose costs and benefits are unevenly spread over time. The action may
involve costly current effort that pays off in the form of future consumption, or
current consumption requiring future compensatory effort. Our comparison of
naive and sophisticated agents in Section 3.5 suggests that in our two-period
model, making agents sophisticated will cause them to emphasize the future
utility impacts of their actions, as they realize that the current utility gains
or losses will be ratcheted away by future utility adjustments. Their decision
making will then rely more heavily on the current implications of their choices.
In essence, sophisticated agents are likely to appear to be more patient.
Consider the following example. Let f1 (x1 ) = −x21 and f2 (x1 , x2 ) = 8x1 (x2 −
2
x2 ). We can think of x1 as an investment, with current cost −x21 , that pays off
1 18
.
A
in the form of future fitness gains. A naive agent chooses x∗1 = 1+γ
sophisticated agent recognizes that any first-period utility impacts of x1 will be
offset by second-period utility adjustments, and hence chooses x1 to maximize
simply the expected second-period expected utility f (x1 , x∗2 ) = 8x1 41 , leading
to pressure to choose the largest possible value of x1 = 1. This agent thus gives
the appearance of being “hyper-patient,” ignoring first-period considerations
altogether. Suppose instead we have f1 (x1 ) = x1 and f2 (x1 , x2 ) = x2 − x22 − x21 ,
so that first-period fitness gains are purchased at the cost of second-period costs.
Training the agent to rely on experienced utility will again give rise to hyperpatience, in this case inducing the agent who ignores the potential first-period
benefits to choose x1 = 0. Either scenario involves potentially disastrous fitness
consequences. A richer model in which agents could be “partially sophisticated”
might give rise to intermediate levels of enhanced patience, while models with
more periods may give rise to more subtle impacts.
agent chooses x∗2 = 12 , in the second period. In the first period, given that the utility

errors vanish, the agent maximizes overall expected fitness (1 + γ)(−x21 ) + 8x1 14 , giving
1
∗
x1 = 1+γ .
18 The
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5

Appendix: Proofs

5.1

Proof of Lemma 2

Taking ε2 → 0. ensures that, for any first-period choice x1 , the agent anticipates
x∗2 (x1 ) as the second-period choice.
The first step of the proof now parallels that of the second period, and is to
rewrite the constraints as
Z Z
V1 (f1 (x∗1 ) + s1 + γ[f1 (x∗1 ) + s1 ] + f2 (x∗1 , x∗2 (x∗1 )) + s2 )g1 (s1 )g2 (s2 )ds1 ds2
Z Z
−
V1 (f1 (x1 ) + s1 + γ[f1 (x1 ) + s1 ] + f2 (x1 , x∗2 (x1 )) + s2 )g1 (s1 )g2 (s2 )ds1 ds2
Z Z
=
V1 (f1 (x∗1 ) + s1 + γ[f1 (x∗1 ) + s1 ] + f2 (x∗1 , x∗2 (x∗1 )) + s2 )g1 (s1 )g2 (s2 )ds2
Z Z
−
V1 (f1 (x1 ) + s1 + γ[f1 (x1 ) + s1 ] + f2 (x1 , x∗2 (x1 )) + s2 )g1 (s2 )g2 (s2 )ds2
= ε1 .
The next task is to execute the corresponding change of variable to rewrite these
constraints as
Z
V1 (z)g(z − [(1 + γ)f1 (x∗1 ) + f2 (x∗1 , x∗2 (x∗1 ))])dz
(19)
Z
−
V1 (z)g(z − [(1 + γ)f1 (x1 ) + f2 (x1 , x∗2 (x1 ))])dz
Z
=
V1 (z)g(z − [(1 + γ)f1 (x∗1 ) + f2 (x∗1 , x∗2 (x∗1 ))])dz
Z
−
V1 (z)g(z − [(1 + γ)f1 (x1 ) + f2 (x1 , x∗2 (x1 ))])dz
= ε1 ,

(20)

where g is the density of the random variable (1 + γ)s̃1 + s̃2 .
This ensures that there exists a Ẑ1 with the property that V1 (z) = 0 for
z < Ẑ1 and V1 (z) = 1 for z > Ẑ1 , if we can show that g is symmetric and
unimodal with zero derivative only at 0. In addition, as ε1 → 0, Ẑ1 approaches
(1 + γ)f1 (x∗1 ) + f2 (x∗1 , x∗2 (x∗1 )).
The next step of the proof is to establish that g indeed has the required
properties. It is clear that these properties are preserved under multiplication
by a nonzero scalar, so it suffices to show that if two arbitrary random variables
s̃1 and s̃2 , with densities g1 and g2 , have these properties, then so does their
sum. Let s = s1 + s2 for feasible values of s and define:
σ 2 (s)

=

max{s2 , s − s1 }

σ 2 (s)

=

min{s2 , s − s1 }.

24

Notice that σ 2 (s) < σ 2 (s) and that, from symmetry, s1 = −s1 and s2 = −s2 .
Then, letting G be the cumulative distribution of the sum s, we have
Z σ2 (s)
Z s2
Z σ2 (s)
G(s) =
G1 (s1 )g2 (s2 )ds2 +
G1 (s − s2 )g2 (s2 )ds2 +
G1 (s1 )g2 (s2 )ds2
s2

Z

σ 2 (s)

σ 2 (s)

Z

G1 (s − s2 )g2 (s2 )ds2 .

g2 (s2 )ds2 +

=
s2

σ 2 (s)

σ 2 (s)

σ 2 (s)

We say that σ 2 is relevant if σ 2 > s2 (and irrelevant otherwise), and that
σ 2 is relevant if σ 2 < s2 . Differentiating, we have (note that σ 2 > s2 =⇒
dσ
G1 (s − σ 2 ) = 1 and σ 2 = s2 =⇒ ds2 = 0, which between them account for the
second equality):
Z σ2 (s)
dσ 2
dσ 2
− G1 (s − σ 2 )g2 (σ 2 )
+
g(s) = g2 (σ 2 )
g1 (s − s2 )g2 (s2 )ds2
ds
ds
σ 2 (s)
Z σ2 (s)
g1 (s − s2 )g2 (s2 )ds2 .
=
σ 2 (s)

To see that this distribution is symmetric, we note that
Z σ2 (s)
Z σ2 (s)
g(−s) = =
g1 (−s − s2 )g2 (s2 )ds2 =
g1 (s + s2 )g2 (s2 )ds2
σ 2 (s)

Z

σ 2 (s)

σ 2 (s)

Z

σ 2 (s)

g1 (s − s2 )g2 (−s2 )ds2 =

=
σ 2 (s)

g1 (s − s2 )g2 (s2 )ds2 = g(s).
σ 2 (s)

Unimodality, and the presence of a zero derivative only at zero, follow from
taking another derivative to obtain:
G00 (s)

dσ 2
dσ
− g1 (s − σ 2 )g2 (σ 2 ) 2
= g1 (s − σ 2 )g2 (σ 2 )
ds
ds
Z σ2 (s)
+
g10 (s − s2 )g2 (s2 )ds2 .
σ 2 (s)

It suffices to show that the first line is nonnegative and the second line positive
when s < 0, with the reverse holding when s > 0. We present the case for
s > 0, with the case of s < 0 being analogous. Consider the first line. We
dσ 2
2
note that dσ
ds = ds = 1 if σ 2 and σ 2 are both relevant, and that an irrelevant
term gives a zero derivative. Because s > 0, it must be that either (i) only σ 2
is relevant (in which case the first line is nonpositive), (ii) neither σ 2 nor σ 2
is relevant (in which case it is zero) or (iii) both are relevant (in which case
g1 (s − σ 2 ) = g1 (s1 ) = g1 (s1 ) = g1 (s − σ 2 ) and g2 (σ 2 ) < g2 (σ 2 ), with the first
line then again being nonpositive).
Consider the second line. This expression is obviously negative if s−σ 2 (s) >
0, so assume s − σ 2 (s) < 0. Then we can write
Z σ2 (s)
Z −(s−σ2 (s))
Z s−σ2 (s)
g10 (s−s2 )g2 (s2 )ds2 =
g10 (s1 )g2 (s−s1 )ds1 +
g10 (s2 )g2 (s−s1 )ds1 .
σ 2 (s)

−(s−σ 2 (s))

s−σ 2 (s)
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The final term on the right is clearly nonpositive, and so we concentrate on the
first term on the right, for which we have
Z

−(s−σ 2 (s))

g10 (s1 )g2 (s − s1 )ds1

Z

−(s−σ 2 (s))

=

s−σ 2 (s)

g10 (s1 )g2 (s − s1 )ds1 +

0

Z

Z

−(s−σ 2 (s))

g10 (−s1 )g2 (s + s1 )ds1

0
−(s−σ 2 (s))

=

g10 (s1 )[g2 (s − s1 ) − g2 (s + s1 )]ds1 ,

0

which is negative since g10 (s1 ) is negative for s1 > 0 and g2 (s − s1 ) − g2 (s + s1 ) is
positive for s, s1 > 0, completing the argument that g has the desired properties.

5.2

Calculations for Section 4.4

We assume that the functions fi are given by
fi (xi ) = −|x∗i − xi |, i = 1, 2

(21)

so that agents pay a linear penalty for straying away from the optimal choice.
Let p1 , . . . , pK be the probabilities of r1 , . . . , rK , respectively. We can perform the integration in (18) to find that
G2 (Ẑ2k (z1 )−(1+γ)z1 −f2 (xk2 )−rk )−G2 (Ẑ2k (z1 )−(1+γ)z1 −f2 (x∗2 )−rk ) =

ε2
, k = 1, ..., K−1,
V2k+1 − V2k

where G2 is the cumulative distribution function of s̃2 . Evolution’s problem is
K−1
to choose the nontrivial utilities {V2k }k=1
so as to maximize
K
X

pk Πk ,

k=1

where Πk is the expected fitness of an agent who has observed rk and now
chooses from a uniform distribution over the set [xk2 , xk2 ].
The first-order conditions for evolution’s choice of the V2k are thus
pk

∂Πk
∂Πk−1
+ pk−1
∂V2k
∂V2k

∂Πk ∂f2 (xk2 )
∂Πk−1 ∂f2 (xk−1
)
2
+
p
k−1
k
k
k−1
k
∂f2 (x2 ) ∂V2
∂f2 (x2 ) ∂V2
0,
k = 1, ..., K − 1.

= pk
=

Using the envelope theorem, we have
∂f2 (xk2 )
∂V2k

=

∂f2 (xk−1
)
2
k
∂V2

=

−ε2
g2 (Ẑ2k (z1 )

− (1 + γ)z1 − f2 (xk2 ) − rk )(V2k+1 − V2k )2
ε2

g2 (Ẑ2k−1 (z1 )

− (1 + γ)z1 − f2 (xk−1
) − rk−1 )(V2k − V2k−1 )2
2
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so the first-order conditions become

=

∂Πk
pk
∂f2 (xk2 ) g2 (Ẑ2k (z1 ) − (1 + γ)z1 − f2 (xk2 ) − rk )(V2k+1 − V2k )2
pk−1
∂Πk−1
,
k−1
k−1
∂f2 (x2 ) g2 (Ẑ2 (z1 ) − (1 + γ)z1 − f2 (xk−1
) − rk−1 )(V2k − V2k−1 )2
2

for k = 1, ..., K − 1.
xk −x∗
Now note that (21) implies that Πk (xk2 ) = γ 2 2 2 + rk + (1 + γ)z1 , so that
∂Πk
k−1
= ∂f∂Π
. In the limit as ε2 → 0, we have f2 (xk2 ) → f2 (x∗2 ) and
∂f2 (xk )
(xk−1 )
2

2

Ẑ2k (z1 ) → (1 + γ)z1 + γf2 (x∗2 ) + rk . In this limit, then
V2k+1 − V2k
=
V2k − V2k−1

r

pk
.
pk−1

It follows that
V2k
where K

=
=

k−1
X

`−1
X
√

`=1

`=1

(V2`+1 − V2` ) = K

1
PK √
`=1

p`

pm

.
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